Here, the evidence demonstrates that the City attempted to negotiate in good faith, but Joe and James refused to do so. By preemptively informing the City than any offer below $500,000 (an amount higher than the amount later awarded by the jury) would be “insulting,” and informing the City that Joe and James was uninterested in the results of the City’s appraisal, the City’s subsequent delay in sending the appraisal summary to Joe and James was, at most, a harmless violation of OCGA § 22-1-9.
Here, the trial court ordered that post-judgment interest was to cease after the filing of the notice of appeal, rather than until the judgment was paid into the court as required by OCGA § 9-11-67. However, “[p]ost-judgment interest is not abated by an appeal of the judgment, even if the judgment is appealed by the party in whose favor it was rendered.” Threatt v. Forsyth County, 262 Ga. App. 186, 190 (3), 585 S.E.2d 159 (2003) (citation and punctuation omitted). “[P]ost-judgment interest is due from the date the judgment is entered until the date the judgment is paid.” St. Paul Reinsurance Co. v. Ross, 276 Ga. App. 135, 142 (2), 622 S.E.2d 374 (2005) (citation and punctuation omitted, emphasis supplied).
“The trial court had no authority to modify the terms of OCGA § 9-11-67[.]” Threatt v. Forsyth County, 250 Ga. App. 838, 845 (2), 552 S.E.2d 123 (2001). Accordingly, we vacate the order of the trial court as to post-judgment interest and remand the case for judgment to be issued in accordance with this opinion.
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