Dunn v. City of Stonecrest, 368 Ga. App. 736, 890 S.E.2d 781 (2023)
Despite available procedures for administrative review, Stonecrest did not appeal EPD’s decision to grant Metro Green a solid waste handling permit. See OCGA § 12-2-2 (c); OCGA § 12-8-30.2. Such failure usually deprives a trial court of jurisdiction to consider a party’s claims. See We, the Taxpayers v. Bd. of Tax Assessors, 292 Ga. 31, 35 (2), 734 S.E.2d 373 (2012). In this case, however, the trial court found Stonecrest exempt from the exhaustion requirement because, in the trial court’s view, Stonecrest challenged EPD/Dunn’s jurisdiction to act.
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This case does not involve a threshold issue of EPD jurisdiction; issuance of solid waste handling permits clearly falls within the agency’s authority. . . . “Rather, the question [here] is whether [EPD] has properly exercised its authority to do so with respect to the challenged [permit].”
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Although Stonecrest seeks to characterize the permit issued by EPD as “a legal nullity in violation of local and state law,” the city ultimately questions EPD’s decision to rely on the materials in Metro Green’s permit application. This is not a challenge to EPD’s jurisdiction. Under these circumstances, the exception to the exhaustion requirement does not apply.[. . .]
EPD and Dunn assert on appeal — as they did below — that given Stonecrest’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies, they are entitled to summary judgment on the declaratory judgment claim. We are unable, however, to reverse the trial court’s denial of their motion for summary judgment. Instead, we must vacate the trial court’s ruling in this regard and remand for further proceedings because “if the trial court truly lacks subject matter jurisdiction to decide a question, it has no power to enter a judgment on the merits.” [. . . .] The proper remedy for Stonecrest’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies is dismissal of its declaratory judgment claim.
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“[T]he mere authorization to act is insufficient [to support mandamus] unless the law requires performance of the duty.” [. . .] Dunn has discretion in the method and manner in which he investigates potential statutory violations. He was not required to immediately respond to or issue a quick “final decision” on CHASE’s allegations. . . . Accordingly, because CHASE did not have a clear legal right to the relief sought in its mandamus request, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to CHASE and denying EPD/Dunn’s request for summary judgment on this claim.