Various charter schools operating in DeKalb County (collectively “Appellees”1) sued the DeKalb County School District (“the DCSD” or “the District”) and its board members (collectively “Appellants”2) alleging that Appellants have breached the charter schools’ respective contracts in various ways and underfunded the schools. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to Appellees as to liability, and Appellants seek review of that decision. As we discuss below, this action is not barred by sovereign immunity; further, we see no reversible error with respect to the grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellees. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
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Under the Charter Schools Act, a “charter” is defined as
a performance based contract between a local board and a charter petitioner, the terms of which are approved by the local board and by the state board in the case of a local charter school; between the state board and a charter petitioner, the terms of which are approved by the state board in the case of a state chartered special school; or between a local board and the state board, the terms of which are approved by the state board in the case of a charter system. By entering into a charter, a charter petitioner and local board shall be deemed to have agreed to be bound to all the provisions of [the Charter Schools Act of 1998] as if such terms were set forth in the charter.
(Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 20-2-2062 (1).
111213The plain language of this provision establishes that a “charter” is, in fact, a “contract,” and, further, that the parties, by entering into a contract, “agree to be bound to all provisions of [the Charter Schools Act of 1998] as if such terms were set forth in the charter.” Id.