Cardinale v. Westmoreland, A22A1678, 2023 WL 2491898 (Ga. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2023). To get the full import, read the opinion in full. But here are important excerpts:
[W]e held that private citizens such as Cardinale do have a cause of action for civil penalties under the Open Records Act. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order holding to the contrary and remand to address the remaining arguments that the defendants presented in their motion to dismiss.
[. . .]
Cardinale further argues that the trial court erred by concluding that [Council members] were entitled to official immunity for Counts Nine and Ten, which sought civil penalties for their decision to enter into executive sessions during their February 11, 2020, and February 12, 2020 meetings to discuss potential litigation over the housing ordinance. He specifically challenges the trial court’s ruling that the council members’ decision to enter into the executive sessions was a discretionary act for which Cardinale was required to show that they acted with actual malice. We agree with the trial court that the City Council’s decision to enter an executive session was a discretionary act, and so we affirm the grant of summary judgment on these claims.
[. . .]
Because Cardinale only alleged that the council members were negligent and did not allege or produce evidence that they acted with willfulness, malice or corruption,5 the council members are entitled to official immunity for his claims alleging that they violated the Open Meetings Act by using their discretion to enter into the executive sessions. Thus, the trial court correctly granted official immunity to Westmoreland and Ide on Counts Nine and Ten of Cardinale’s complaint.
[. . .]
While the fact that an agency must vote on an issue may certainly be indicative that the issue is discretionary, see, e. g., Division Three, supra, in this case, we cannot conclude that the mere fact that the council must vote to approve the minutes necessarily renders the act of approving the minutes discretionary rather than ministerial.
Thus, we conclude that the trial court correctly determined that the council members’ approval of the minutes of the Council’s two February 2020 meetings was a ministerial duty.
[. . .]
Finally, on this record, we cannot conclude that there is no issue of material fact as to the council members’ negligence in failing to comply with OCGA § 50-14-4 (a)’s requirement that the “specific reasons” for the closure be entered upon the minutes. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order denying Westmoreland and Ide’s motion for summary judgment on Counts Eleven and Twelve.